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Individual Communitarianism 	  
Exploring the Primacy of the Individual In Locke’s and Hegel’s Rights 
 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit 
of Happiness” (U.S. Declaration of Independence, par. 2). Arguably one of the best-known and 
most repeated phrases in American history, the origin of this statement is often attributed to John 
Locke. Whether accrediting Locke in this way is incorrect, as some scholars have argued, or 
indeed correct, the resemblance of this statement to Locke’s theory of rights cannot plausibly be 
denied. In his Second Treatise On Government (1689) Locke presents the similar notion of some 
inalienable rights to “life, health, liberty, and property,” that are held by all human beings and 
can be summarized as natural and property rights (Locke, par. 6). These are generally understood 
as a defense of individualism, or the promotion of individual independence and the precedence 
of individual interests over state interests, a notion that later constituted a foundational principle 
of the United States after its secession from British rule.  
 
Over a century after Locke’s work appeared, the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel disputed Locke’s natural and property rights, as well as many other philosophical theories, 
in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Most notably: instead of prioritizing the individual, 
Hegel’s system of rights is based on a principle of the supremacy of the state, claimed to be the 
only place where humans can really be free. In other words, the prime concern for Hegelian 
rights is not the wellbeing of the individual, but of the society as a whole. However, Hegel 
understands freedom not as something that can be externally imposed by ascribing series of 
rights, but rather as a historical process of development whereby mankind must go through two 
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stages of incomplete freedom – personal freedom and universal freedom, in that order – before 
arriving at the “Idea of the will which is free in and for itself” (Hegel, par. 33).  
 
What Hegel seeks to reconstruct through this chronological account of the evolution of freedom 
is the development of the main philosophical theories of rights. As Steven Smith successfully 
explains in Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism, Hegel groups these liberal theories of rights in terms 
of their “methodological approaches to the study of rights” (Smith, 65).  Smith identifies two 
major approaches of this kind: the “empirical approach, by which he means the early modern 
theories of Hobbes and Locke” (Smith, 65) and the “formal or transcendental approach ascribed 
to the philosophies of Kant and Fichte” (Smith, 70).  
 
As the first instance Hegel presents of freedom, abstract right can be understood in this way as 
seeking to “preserve what he found of value” in Locke’s theory, while simultaneously 
“reformulating it in ways that are more sensitive to the cultural and historical context of rights” 
(Smith, x). Since Hegel’s abstract right is thereby (allegedly) intended to point out the 
shortcomings of Locke’s theory of natural and property rights, a comparison of the notion of 
abstract right with that of natural right will reveal the major distinctions in the two theories. In 
this article, I will first argue that Locke’s foundation of rights is more individualistic than 
Hegel’s because it is based on an understanding of personhood in an individual sense, while 
Hegel’s is not. Next, I will demonstrate how the nature of Locke’s rights is also more conducive 
to individual wellbeing than that of Hegel’s, since the former entails fewer obligations that might 
go against what is in the individual’s self-interest. Finally, I will assert that the extent of the 
rights themselves is a third aspect in which Locke’s theory of rights is more geared towards the 
individual than Hegel’s, since the Lockean state exists for the purpose of protecting the 
individual’s right to property, while the Hegelian state exists in order to limit and regulate this 
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same right. I then conclude this essay with the clarification that Locke’s stronger rooting of his 
theory in the primacy of the individual does not make Hegel an extreme communitarian, but 
instead the German philosopher’s ideas should be regarded as a midway between individualism 
and communitarianism.  
 
The foundations that Locke and Hegel envision for rights differ in several respects, and thereby 
eventually lead to two entirely dissimilar conceptions of a system of rights. As numerous as 
these differences may be, they can all be traced back to, and ultimately attributed to, their 
disagreement on one fundamental issue, namely what it means to be a person. Locke argues that 
what distinguishes a person from an animal or any other living thing is that a person is a subject, 
a being whose existence is an end in itself, while all other things in the world, whether living or 
inanimate, exist merely as a means to the end of mankind’s survival. His justification for this 
definition is the deontological argument that “God gave the earth to mankind,” and as a result 
“all the fruits [the earth] naturally produces, and all the beasts it feeds, belong to mankind” 
(Locke, par. 26). 	  
 
Hegel disputes this characterization of personhood when he holds that “the person is essentially 
different from the subject” because “any living thing whatever is a subject” (Hegel, par. 35). 
Instead, he presents the more narrow definition of a person as “a subject which is aware of this 
subjectivity […] the individuality of freedom in pure being-for-itself”  (Hegel, par. 35). It is 
clear, then, that Locke understands personhood as a primarily individual concept, as one that is 
automatically assigned to each human being when (s)he is born, whereas Hegel perceives 
personhood as a common notion, as something that must be attained by mankind in general, and 
can only be achieved within a society. 	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Herein commences the divergence in the argumentative paths at the bases of Locke’s natural 
notion of rights and Hegel’s abstract notion of rights. If rights are principles conducive to 
freedom, held by all people, it follows that what makes someone a person is what entitles him or 
her to those rights. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Locke’s and Hegel’s respective theories of 
rights take on completely different forms, since they are grounded in two different views 
regarding why people are entitled to rights. This becomes clear when Locke and Hegel both hold 
that human beings exist as individuals in the state of nature when they are outside of society, but 
their dissimilar definitions of personhood lead them to dissimilar interpretations of said state. 	  	  
Locke understands the state of nature simply as that which happens at beginning of the history of 
mankind, since the individuals at this stage are still real persons, or subjects, according to him. 
Hegel, on the other hand, believes that personhood cannot be attained outside of society, 
meaning humans do not truly exist as individuals alienated from society, and so the state of 
nature is not strictly real. Rather, he argues, since only social life and spirit are real, individuals 
separated from society merely believe they are in the state of nature, and are instead abstracted 
from reality at this stage which takes place in the beginning of the development of the human 
will, in the “sphere of abstract or formal right” (Hegel, par. 33). The two theories of rights are 
thus devised for entirely different kinds of people in entirely different contexts, and their 
foundations can best be understood when presented as two logical arguments that follow from 
these initial premises, as I will argue in the following paragraphs.  
 
In Locke’s terms, the notion of natural rights follows directly from his understanding of 
personhood and the state of nature. Since individuals in the state of nature are still real human 
beings according to Locke, then any rights ascribed to men by virtue of their human nature must 
also apply in the State or Nature “prior to some institutionalized jurisdiction” (Kelly, 45). These 
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rights, then, cannot “follow from the authoritative commands of a municipal legislature,” but 
instead must come from some other source (Kelly, 45). Locke identifies this source to be the so-
called “Law of Nature” that “commands that we preserve ourselves and as far as possible 
preserve others as our equals” (Kelly, 44). From said law Locke directly derives the notion of 
natural rights as the inalienable individual rights to life, liberty and property. 
 
In his chapter Of Property, Locke lays out the groundwork for his theory of property rights. In 
particular, he wants to demonstrate how and why there is an individual, natural right to property 
when “God gave [the world] to mankind in common” (Locke, par. 25). The reason God gave the 
earth to mankind in common, Locke argues, is specifically for the survival and wellbeing of all 
men, and the only way mankind can make use of the earth’s resources to this end is by use of a 
“means to appropriate” these (Locke, par. 26). This implies that there is a natural right to life and 
or each individual to take to himself whatever is necessary to sustain his life. Locke subsequently 
posits that, as subjects, “every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right 
to but himself” (Locke, par. 27). If each individual is the sole possessor of his own body, it 
follows that “the labour of his body, and the work of his hands […] are properly his” (Locke, 
par. 27).  Therefore, even though God gave the earth to mankind in common, as subjects we have 
a right to appropriate to ourselves from the common whatever we mix our labor into. To put this 
point alternately, Locke has established with these foundations “a natural right to individual 
appropriation” (Macpherson, xvi). 	  
 
Hegel arrives at the same conclusion of a right to individual private property, but through an 
entirely different path of reasoning, which is unsurprising since “Hegel’s objection to empirical 
theories of natural right turns not so much on their conclusions as on the method by which they 
purport to arrive at them” (Smith, 67). According to him, since individuals in the realm of 
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abstract right have not achieved the state of personhood, they are incomplete, and they seek 
reconciliation with the rest of the world. This notion of the incomplete person is reminiscent of 
the myth told by Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium, where Zeus cuts all human beings in two, 
and as a result each person is “half” of an original human that is forever longing for its 
counterpart, “desiring to be reunited” with it (Plato, 191b). Just as Aristophanes’ characters are 
not their full selves on their own, so the Hegelian person cannot fully be himself outside of 
society. 
 
Furthermore, Hegel claims that the possession of something is essentially the expansion of one’s 
will into that thing, and in this way understanding one’s relationship to it. Unlike Locke, Hegel 
does not believe human beings automatically possess their bodies by virtue of being subjects, but 
rather we take possession of them at a particular point in our lives. In order to reconcile our 
individual selves with the rest of the world, it is not enough to perceive ourselves as persons, we 
need to express our personality by expanding our will into this world. The way we do this, Hegel 
argues, is through individual private property, because by possessing things we express our own 
particularity, or mark our distinctiveness, as a person and facilitate our own self-understanding. 
In short, insofar as Hegel’s abstract right is concerned, individual private property is “one of 
those rights that give me the status of a person” (Rose, 68). 
 
In summary, the different interpretations of personhood that Locke and Hegel hold lead them to 
differ greatly on their justifications for a system of rights. Insofar as the foundations for rights 
are concerned, then, Locke does indeed prioritize more than Hegel the primacy of the individual 
in his vision of rights, since Locke introduces inalienable rights that individuals have prior to the 
creation of formal state structures, and Hegel thinks individuals outside of the structure of 
society are not entitled to rights because they are not persons. It is thereby evident that, to a 
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significant extent, Locke’s foundation for his theory of rights is more rooted in the primacy of 
the individual than that of Hegel. Far from being merely theoretical, these foundations directly 
shape the nature and extent of the rights themselves in each theory, and are in this sense 
particularly significant.   
 
With regards to the nature of the rights themselves in the Lockean and Hegelian theories, there 
are two major distinctions. The first of these is highlighted by Hegel himself and concerns the 
right to private property, the central right that both theories ascribe to individuals. For Locke, the 
natural right to individual property exists because “God gave [the world] to mankind” to 
preserve the life and freedom of men (Locke, par. 26). From this, it follows that the right to 
individual property exists for the purpose of preserving man’s life and freedom, or “as a means” 
(Hegel, par. 45). For Hegel, meanwhile, the right to private property is not just a means to the 
end of expressing one’s personality but, “as the first existence of freedom, [it] is an essential end 
for itself” (Hegel, par. 45). 	  
 
The second distinction in the nature of Lockean and Hegelian rights concerns the types of rights 
included in natural rights and abstract rights. For Locke, natural rights are based on the Law of 
Nature, whereby “no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions” and 
“just as [each individual] is bound to preserve himself, […] so by the like reason, when his own 
preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of 
mankind” by not taking away or impairing “the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of 
another” (Locke, par. 6). Therefore, natural rights involve not just negative prohibitions of the 
violation of rights, but also positive rights, or positive obligations that an individual has to 
others. Locke’s vision of rights assigns both rights to individual preservation of one’s “life, 
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health, liberty, and property” and moral duties to preserve the “life, health, liberty and property” 
of other people (Locke, par. 6). 	  
 
This stands in contrast to the Hegelian notion of abstract right, which entails “only [negative] 
prohibitions” of right and “the positive form of commandments of right [in abstract right] is, in 
its ultimate content, based on prohibition” (Hegel, par. 38). For example, while the 
“commandment of right” is “be a person and respect other as persons” (Hegel, par. 36), its 
abstractness limits the right to the negative necessity “not to violate personality and what ensues 
from personality” (Hegel, par. 38). The reason behind this limitation is that in the realm of 
abstract right, since individuals are abstracted from social life, they do not perceive others as 
unique beings, but solely as “universal rights-bearers” who are entitled to the same rights as 
themselves (Rose, 60). Having obligations towards someone, Hegel argues, requires treating 
them “in some sense as a particular person and not a formal universal rights-bearer,” and the 
realm of abstract right does not have the social context necessary for individuals to perceive 
others as unique persons (Rose, 60). In this sense, Hegel’s notion of abstract right distinguishes 
rights “not to violate personality” (Hegel, par. 36) from positive moral duties that we have 
towards others, assigning the latter to the “higher ground” of “morality” (Hegel, par. 106). 	  
 
This distinction in the kind of rights included in natural rights and abstract right is particularly 
consequential in the political philosophies of Locke and Hegel. It is because Locke asserts that 
the Law of Nature and natural rights include moral duties that his theory of society being rooted 
in contract and based on exchange is plausible. The role of the state can be limited to the 
protection of individual rights to property and society can stem from contracts or exchange only 
because the moral obligations are imposed by the Law of Nature, and if one disobeys the Law of 
Nature one thereby renounces his status as a human being. By the same line of reasoning, since 
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Hegel does not include moral obligations in abstract right, he does not believe society can be 
based on the contracts of abstract right, since “punishment is necessary for a system of abstract 
right to be effective” and “punishment requires the idea of intentional action and individual 
moral law” (Rose, 74). In other words, abstract right and contract is incomplete without an 
explanation of morality by some external authority figure that is recognized by individuals as an 
authority, namely the state. This is what Hegel calls “ethical life” and what he claims society is 
really rooted in (Hegel, par. 143).	  
 
Upon first examination of the nature of natural rights and that of abstract rights, it would appear 
that natural rights are less conducive to the individual’s wellbeing because they are a mere means 
and they assign a moral duty to individuals that might cause them to act against what is in their 
own self-interest. Notwithstanding, this conclusion is turned on its head and refuted if we take 
into consideration Hegel’s system of rights at large. While Hegel’s right to private property may 
indeed be an end in itself and Locke’s merely a means, this does not necessarily make Hegel’s 
right to individual, private property more important or significant, since the end of property 
according to Hegel is to assure the individual moment of existence only within and limited by the 
state, whereas the end for Locke is to secure and retain the freedom for all citizens on an 
individual basis. Further, when we consider the entire Philosophy of Right in this way, it 
becomes clear that Hegel’s individuals not only have a moral obligation to others in the realm of 
morality, but also ethical obligations to the state in the final stage of freedom, or “ethical life” 
(Hegel, par. 143). Locke’s law of nature, on the other hand, only commits individuals to helping 
others insofar as “his own preservation comes not in competition,” once again demonstrating the 
importance of the individual in this theory. All things considered, therefore, Hegel imposes more 
obligations than Locke that might entail a suppression of the individual’s self-interest for the 
benefit of the community, at least in terms of the types of rights they each devise.  The different 
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extents of the rights themselves must now be compared as well, so as to determine the true 
significance of Locke’s theory being more rooted in individualism than Hegel’s. 
 
The extent of the rights themselves in Locke’s natural rights and Hegel’s abstract right can best 
be assessed in terms of the right to private property, as it is one both theories include. For Locke, 
individuals have a right to appropriate from the common anything in which they have “mixed 
[their] labour” (Locke, par. 25). For Hegel, the mixing of one’s labor into a common property is 
not necessary to rightfully appropriate something: a person can take possession of anything that 
does not belong to someone else. Furthermore, he holds that there are three methods for the 
appropriation of something: physical seizure, alteration or creation, and “designating its 
ownership” by marking it with a sign (Hegel, par. 54). Although Hegel classifies physical seizure 
and alteration as less complete forms of appropriation, he claims “designation is the most 
complete mode of all, for the effect of the sign is more or less implicit in the other ways of taking 
possession, too” (Hegel, par. 58). It is thus easier for individuals to take possession of things in 
Hegel’s vision of rights, since they only have to mark it with a sign, than in Locke’s conception 
of rights, whereby they must mix their labor into it. 	  
 
The extent of the Lockean individual right to private property is limited further by the 
restrictions he imposes on the right to appropriation. The first of these is that one can only 
appropriate something insofar as “there is enough, and as good, left in common for others” 
(Locke, par. 25). To be sure, this condition does not require that there is enough and as good left 
of the specific appropriated thing, but rather of earthly resources in general for others to secure 
their own preservation and wellbeing. The second restriction Locke introduces is that one can 
appropriate only as much as “might serve to his use,” because “nothing was made by God for 
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man to spoil or destroy” (Locke, par. 30). Hegel introduces no such restrictions, asserting instead 
that you can own something without using it. 	  
 
Nonetheless, there is little consensus among scholars as to what the constraints actually entail for 
Locke’s theory of rights, especially the first one. Macpherson, for instance, argues in his 
introduction to Locke’s Second Treatise on Government that the introduction of money renders 
the usage condition “inoperative,” because any amount of perishable possessions that might 
“spoil” can just be exchanged for money (Macpherson, xvii). Macpherson also posits that the 
enough and as good condition is always satisfied in the private appropriation of land, because 
“appropriated land is ten times more productive [than] land left in common, so even when the 
land is all appropriated there is more produce for society” (Macpherson, xvii). “The original 
requirement,” he continues, “had been that private appropriation should leave enough to meet 
everyone’s equal right to subsistence, and that requirement was still satisfied after all the land 
had been taken up” (Macpherson, xvii). 	  	  
In his article “Enough and as Good Left for Others,” Jeremy Waldron explicitly opposes 
Macpherson’s interpretation of Locke’s constraints, and he argues that the “enough and as good” 
restriction (whereby one can appropriate only insofar as there is enough and of equal quality left 
for others) is “not intended by Locke as a restriction on acquisition” (Waldron, 324). The only 
genuine restriction on property rights derived from the Law of Nature, Waldron posits, is the 
second constraint to appropriate only as much as one can use before it spoils. Waldron also 
highlights how, when the state of nature turns into political society, the legislature is “entitled to 
see that the abundance of possessions of some men is neither based on nor results in the abject 
deprivation and impoverishment of others,” and this is “a far stronger constraint on private 
property than the ‘enough as good’ clause” (Waldron, 327). 	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Still another interpretation of these constraints is that of Sreenivasan in The Limits of Lockean 
Rights In Property. Somewhat similar to Waldron in this sense, Sreenivasan asserts that not only 
are the conditions of “spoilage and sufficiency” placed on “the legitimacy of a man’s property,” 
(Sreenivasan, 101), but also two additional ones of “charity and inheritance” (Sreenivasan, 102). 
The first of these refers to how the “right of charity [towards] the disabled, poor and needy” 
(Sreenivasan, 103) applies against the excessiveness or surplus of a person’s goods, implying 
that “as long as a man is in possession of surplus goods, he has no right to refuse subsistence to 
the disabled needy” (Sreenivasan, 104). In this way, “Locke’s property is limited by its liability 
to sustain the demands of charity” The second condition of inheritance that Sreenivasan 
introduces refers to how, since “children are entitled to be maintained by their parents,” when 
their parents die they “inherit all of his possessions” (Sreenivasan, 105), thus signifying that 
family holdings are conserved “in perpetuity” (Sreenivasan, 106).  
 
Regardless of which of these individual understandings, if any, of Locke’s restrictions on private 
property we accept as true, Macpherson, Waldron and Sreenivasan appear to both impose (or 
imply) more limitations on property rights than Hegel imposes. In order to avoid jumping to 
erroneous conclusions, however, we must also consider the role that Locke and Hegel 
respectively assign to the state in relation to property rights. For Locke, civil society with its 
government is introduced and exists primarily “to protect the natural right to property of men,” 
in other words to protect the freedom of the individual, and cannot act contrary to the interests of 
the individual citizens (Macpherson, xvii). For Hegel, however, the state limits property rights of 
individuals, for example by specifying the rules of what things can be appropriated, and the 
individual has an obligation to obey the state regardless of his individual desires. In terms of 
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extent too, then, Locke emphasizes the individual more than Hegel in their respective theories of 
rights.  
 
To conclude, Locke and Hegel have fundamentally different theories of rights in terms of their 
foundations, nature and extent. The foundations they envision are dissimilar because Locke 
understands humans as individual subjects that are thereby entitled to certain rights regardless of 
their contextual circumstances, while Hegel does not believe individuals have rights until they 
achieve personhood within personhood in society. Naturally, this results in different paths of 
reasoning in the foundations of the two theories, since Locke and Hegel want to arrive at two 
different series of rights that are not even of the same kind.  
 
While the nature and extent of abstract right might seem to be more individualistic than Locke’s 
when taken strictly on their own, the very purpose of Hegel’s inclusion of abstract right in his 
theory of right is to highlight its insufficiency as a complete account of rights or freedom until it 
is combined with the notion of morality. Therefore, the realms of morality and ethical life must 
also be included in the comparison of Hegel and Locke’s rights, or at the very least should be 
kept in mind. When we include the entire Hegelian system of right in this way, it becomes 
apparent that the nature and extent of Locke’s natural rights are also more oriented towards the 
primacy of the individual than these same elements of Hegel’s abstract right.  
 
 To be sure, the conclusion that Locke’s rights are more grounded in individualism does not 
imply that Hegel’s rights are communitarian in the Aristotelian sense, or that Hegel himself 
pertains to this school of thought. Instead, Hegel can be seen as a sort of middle ground between 
these two positions: he returns to Aristotle’s notion of a realm of the community, but also holds 
that we perceive ourselves as individuals with certain rights. Thus, it is not exclusively 
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individual or universal freedom that real freedom consists of in Hegel’s account, but instead the 
combination and harmony of these two in the realm of ethical life ruled by the state.  
 
From this perspective, it is unsurprising that the foundations of American society and cultural 
values are primarily based on a Lockean notion of individual rights and freedom, since these 
were introduced in order to justify the independence of the U.S. from British rule. The American 
desire for independence was in large part due to their disagreement with the tax policies imposed 
by the British crown on the subjects in the North American colonies, who had no representation 
in the British Parliament. Thus, it is only to be expected that James Madison and the other 
founders of the United States chose to ascribe rights primarily to individuals, in the hopes that 
they might be more suited to safeguard their own freedom and with the aim of avoiding a similar 
subjection of U.S. citizens to an overly powerful state in the future.  
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